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Identification of Network Vulnerabilities through IISRA Framework

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Abstract: As the globe transitions to complicated networks and as we move towards digitization, its worth is rising daily. Working in an organization across a network and the internet creates vulnerabilities. As is well known, data is a crucial component of every organization and must be safeguarded from threats. The attackers' job is to try and take advantage of the networks by using these weaknesses. When organizations use the Internet, intranets, and related technologies more frequently, system security becomes one of the key considerations. Network security protects computer systems from unauthorized threats and breaches, which lowers the likelihood that confidential information may be stolen. The organization will feel more secure if these vulnerabilities are closed up in the systems and network well in advance of an attack. The availability of numerous technologies for network vulnerability assessment enables organizations to thwart potential attacks. In this research paper, we have developed an Integrated Information Security Risk Assessment (IISRA) Framework for identification of Network Vulnerabilities. We have implemented this IISRA Framework on real computing environment of an organization. Keywords: Network Vulnerabilities, Risk, Threat, Impact.

I. INTRODUCTION

The internet is the method that people use the most frequently in the twenty-first century to collect information and data. The main purpose of the internet is to convey information from one node to another through a network. The development of computer networks, mobile devices, and other technologies has significantly increased internet usage. For efficient data distribution, the Internet is a global network of millions of uniquely interconnected computers, networks, and related devices. These data, which were moved from one machine to another, contain extremely sensitive information that must be safeguarded. Cybercriminals are attracted to the internet because of this sudden rise in usage and the significant volume of important data being transferred from one computer to another [1], [2].

When an unauthorized person, programme, or illegal infiltration enters a computer or network with the intention of doing harm or interfering with the usual course of business, the integrity and security of the computer system are put at risk. ICT (information and communication technology) has significantly improved governance effectiveness and ease for people. The trend of cyberattacks has moved from small-scale intrusion attempts and financial breaches to highly organized state-sponsored operations due to the growing reliance on ICT and sophistication of attack tactics [3].

These cyberattacks prompted the development of cyber security and its defenses against damaging cyberattacks [4]. The human factor is one of the main causes of the success of many cyberattacks since the untrained computer user is the weakest link that social engineering by cybercriminals targets.

To reduce the likelihood that computer hackers and attackers would take advantage of human weaknesses, formal cyber security awareness is necessary [5, 6].

Cybersecurity is a collection of security methods that can be used to safeguard user assets and the internet from intrusion and attack. From this vantage point, it is obvious that cybercriminals have a strong propensity to attack any database that includes important data that could expose that specific database. Additionally, all fields and areas of human endeavor are now the targets of cyberattackers who want to invade their privacy, break into their systems, gather crucial data, and make it accessible to the general public [7-9]. Fighting these cyber security threats and keeping up with their increasing speed is becoming more and more difficult [10-15].

II. IISRA FRAMEWORK FOR NETWORK VULNERABILITIES IDENTIFICATION

We have developed an Integrated Information Security Risk Assessment (IISRA) Framework for identification of Network vulnerabilities. IISRA Framework helps in identifying and assessing potential security vulnerabilities of network.





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Fig 1: IISRA Framework for Network Vulnerability Identification

The process of IISRA network vulnerability identification involves the following steps:

- 1) Preparation: Before starting the identification, it is important to prepare the network and the vulnerability scanning tool. This may involve installing and configuring the vulnerability scanning tool, determining the scope of the scan (e.g., which systems and devices will be included), and ensuring that the necessary permissions and access controls are in place.
- 2) Scan Configuration: This involves setting up the vulnerability scanning tool and configuring it to scan the desired network assets. The scan configuration may include specifying the IP address range to be scanned, the types of vulnerabilities to be searched for, and the level of detail to be included in the scan results.
- 3) Scan Initiation: This involves starting the vulnerability scan, which typically involves sending packets to the target systems and analyzing the responses to identify potential vulnerabilities
- 4) Scan Progress Monitoring: This involves monitoring the progress of the scan to ensure that it is running as expected and to identify any issues that may impact the accuracy of the scan results.
- 5) Scan Results Analysis: This involves reviewing the results of the vulnerability scan to identify the potential security risks to the network. The results are typically displayed in a report that includes information about each identified vulnerability, including its severity, the potential impact of exploitation, and recommended remediation steps.
- 6) False Positive Verification: This involves verifying that the vulnerabilities identified by the scan are actual security weaknesses and not false positives, which are inaccuracies in the scan results that do not represent actual vulnerabilities.
- 7) Risk Prioritization: This involves prioritizing the vulnerabilities based on their potential impact and likelihood of exploitation, and determining the appropriate response for each vulnerability, such as patching, mitigating, or accepting the risk.
- 8) Remediation: This involves implementing the recommended remediation steps for each vulnerability, such as applying patches, modifying access controls, or deploying security controls to mitigate the risk.

It is important to perform regular vulnerability scans to ensure that the network remains secure and to identify new vulnerabilities as they emerge. The results of the vulnerability scan should be combined with the results of other assessment methods, such as manual review and penetration testing, to provide a complete view of the network's security posture.

III. RESULTS AND REMEDIATION PLAN

We have implemented IISRA Framework in the real scenario of an organization to assess the Network vulnerabilities of that organization. We have identified total 94 assets in the organization [].



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Table 1: Assets of the Organization

| Network Device | Server | Workstation | WIFI controller |
|----------------|--------|-------------|-----------------|
| 2 | 8 | 83 | 1 |

Below table illustrates distribution of observations of Network vulnerabilities identification based on the risk categorization i.e., Critical, High, Medium, and Low.

1) Network Devices

Table 2: Risk Assessment result of Network Devices

| Domain | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Total |
|--------------------------|----------|------|--------|-----|-------|
| Vulnerability Assessment | 0 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 8 |

2) Servers

Table 3: Risk Assessment result of Servers

| Domain | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Total |
|--------------------------|----------|------|--------|-----|-------|
| Vulnerability Assessment | 4 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 14 |

3) Workstations

Table 4: Risk Assessment result of Workstations

| Domain | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Total |
|--------------------------|----------|------|--------|-----|-------|
| Vulnerability Assessment | 3 | 4 | 9 | 2 | 18 |

4) WIFI Controller

Table 5: Risk Assessment result of WIFI Controller

| Domain | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Total |
|--------------------------|----------|------|--------|-----|-------|
| Vulnerability Assessment | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 8 |

Table 6: Network Device Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan through IISRA Framework

| Vulnerabilities | Impact | Risk | Observations | Recommendations |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| SSL Certificate | This can be used by an | High | It has been observed that | It is recommended to sign SSL |
| Signed Using Weak | attacker to create a new | | SSL certificate is signed | certificate using strong |
| Hashing Algorithm | certificate with the identical | | using SHA-1With RSA | encryption algorithm such as |
| | digital signature, giving them | | Encryption. | SHA-512. |
| | the ability to pretend to be | | | |
| | the affected Service. | | | |
| Unencrypted Telnet | This enables a remote man- | High | It has been observed that | It is recommended to disable |
| Server | in-the-middle attacker to | | remote host is using | the Telnet service and use SSH |
| | eavesdrop in on a Telnet | | unencrypted telnet | instead. |
| | session to intercept traffic | | services. Since telnet is | |
| | between a client and server | | being used inside the | |
| | and intercept credentials or | | secured network hence it | |
| | other sensitive information. | | has least impact. | |



| Internet Key | Aggressive Mode with Pre- | Medium | It has been | It is recommended to disable |
|---|---|--------|--|--|
| Exchange (IKE) Aggressive Mode with Pre- Shared | Shared Key (PSK) authentication appears to be supported by the remote | | Observed that remote host supports aggressive mode with | Aggressive Mode if supported. Do not use Pre- Shared key for authentication if it's possible. |
| Key | Internet Key Exchange (IKE) version 1 service. A VPN | | pre-shared key (PSK). | If using Pre-Shared key cannot be avoided, use very strong |
| | gateway's PSK could be captured and cracked using such a configuration, giving an attacker unauthorized | | | keys. If possible, do not allow VPN connections from any IP addresses. |
| TLS Version 1.1 Protocol Deprecated | access to private networks. TLS 1.1 does not permit the usage of ciphers that support encryption prior to MAC | Medium | It has been observed that Remote host supports TLS version 1.1. | It is recommended to enable support for TLS 1.2 and/or 1.3, and disable support for TLS 1.1. |
| | computation or authorized encryption modes like GCM. Hence, a man-in-the-middle attack on the remote host is possible. | | | |
| SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted | Any interruption in the chain makes it more difficult for users to confirm the authenticity and identity of the web server if the remote host is a public host in production. This might make man-in-the-middle attacks against the remote host simpler to execute. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using untrusted SSL certificate. | It is recommended to purchase or generate a proper SSL certificate for this service. |
| JQuery 1.2 < 3.5.0 Multiple XSS | Cross-site scripting attacks can be carried out in a variety of ways by an attacker. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is running on outdated jQuery version. | It is recommended to upgrade to jQuery version 3.5.0 or later. |
| IP Forwarding Enabled | An attacker can use this to evade some firewalls, routers, and NAC filtering by routing packets through the host. | Medium | It has been observed that IP forwarding is enabled on remote hosts. | It is recommended to disable the IP Forwarding. |
| SSH Weak Key Exchange Algorithms Enabled | Attackers can quickly take advantage of a remote SSH server that is set up to support weak key exchange algorithms. | Low | It has been observed that remote host allow weak key exchange algorithms. The following are weak key exchange algorithms that are enabled: diffie-hellman- group-exchange- sha1 diffie-hellman- group1-sha1 | It is recommended to disable the weak key exchange algorithms. |



Table 7: Server Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan through IISRA Framework

| Vulnerabilities | Impact | Risk | Observations | Recommendations |
|--|--|-----------|---------------------------|--|
| Apache 2.4.x< | The remote host's installation | Critical | It has been observed that | It is recommended to upgrade |
| 2.4.53 Multiple | of Apache HTTP Daemon is | | the remote host is using | the Apache version to 2.4.53 or |
| Vulnerabilities | version 2.4.46, which has a | | older Apache version | above. |
| | number of vulnerabilities. A | | 1 | |
| | carefully constructed request | | | |
| | body could result in a read to | | | |
| | a random region of memory, | | | |
| | which might result in a | | | |
| | process crash. When | | | |
| | problems are discovered, it | | | |
| | neglects to terminate the | | | |
| | inbound connection, | | | |
| | discarding the request body | | | |
| | and leaving the server | | | |
| | vulnerable to HTTP Request | | | |
| | Smuggling | | | |
| | Acknowledgements | | | |
| Microsoft SQL | The remote Windows host's | Critical | It has been Observed that | It is recommended to upgrade to |
| Server Unsupported | Microsoft SQL Server is no | 011110411 | Microsoft SQL Server on | Microsoft SQL Server 2019 |
| Version Detection | longer maintained and is | | the remote host is no | (15.x). |
| Cision Betection | likely to have security | | longer supported. | (13.11). |
| | vulnerabilities that an attacker | | longer supported. | |
| | could exploit. | | | |
| SSL Version 2 and | Man-in-the-middle attacks or | Critical | It has been observed that | It is recommended to disable |
| 3 Protocol | the decryption of client-to- | | devices are using SSL | SSL 2.0 and 3.0. Use TLS 1.2 |
| Detection | affected service | | version 2.0 | with higher cipher suites listed |
| | communications are also | | and 3.0. | below. |
| | options for an attacker. | | | |
| Unsupported Web | Absence of support suggests | Critical | It has been observed that | It is recommended to upgrade to |
| Server Detection | that the vendor won't provide | | remote web server is | a supported version if possible |
| | any new security updates for | | obsolete | or switch to another server. |
| | the product. Thus, it can have | | /unsupported. | |
| | security vulnerabilities. | | | |
| SSL Certificate | This can be used by an | High | It has been observed that | It is recommended to sign SSL |
| Signed Using Weak | attacker to create a new | | SSL certificate is signed | certificate using strong |
| Hashing Algorithm | certificate with the identical | | using SHA-1 With RSA | encryption algorithm such as |
| 5 6 | digital signature, giving them | | Encryption. | SHA-512. |
| | | | | |
| | affected Service. | | | |
| SSL Medium | The attacker would find it | High | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
| | much simpler to get around | | | |
| | | | = | application if possible to avoid |
| | | | • • • | use of medium strength ciphers. |
| / | _ | | | |
| | | | | |
| | the use of SSL ciphers that | | attacker is on the same | |
| | | 1 | | 1 |
| SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported SWEET32) | the ability to pretend to be the affected Service. | High | | It is recommended to reconfigure the affected application if possible to a |



| HTTP TRACE /TRACK Methods Allowed | With an XmlHttpRequest, the attacker is reading cookies using the TRACE/TRACK method of cross-site scripting. Modern browsers are unable to accomplish this, hence the vulnerability can only be used to target users of outdated and unpatched browsers. | Medium | It is observed the vulnerability can only be used when targeting users with unpatched and old browsers. | It is recommended to disable these HTTP methods. |
|---|--|--------|--|--|
| SMB Signing not enabled | This can be used by a remote, unauthenticated attacker to launch man-in-the-middle attacks against the SMB server. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is not signing SMB Server. | It is recommended to enable signing is on the remote SMB server. On Windows, this is found in the policy setting 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)'. |
| SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted | Any interruption in the chain makes it more difficult for users to confirm the authenticity and identity of the web server if the remote host is a public host in production. This might make man-in-the-middle attacks against the remote host simpler to execute. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using untrusted SSL certificate. | It is recommended to purchase or generate a proper SSL certificate for this service. |
| SSL RC4 Cipher Suites Supported (Bar Mitzvah) | An attacker may be able to deduce the plaintext if the plaintext is repeatedly encrypted (for example, in HTTP cookies) and the attacker can access a large number of ciphertexts (tens of millions). | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using weak cipher suite such as RC4-MD5-128bit and RC4-SHA1-128bit. | It is recommended to reconfigure the affected application, if possible, to avoid use of RC4 ciphers. Consider using TLS 1.2 with AES-GCM suites subject to browser and web server support. |
| SSLv3 Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption Vulnerability (POODLE) | A man-in-the-middle (MitM) information disclosure technique called POODLE can be used by an attacker. If a MitM attacker is successful in getting a target application to repeatedly send the same data over freshly formed SSL 3.0 connections, they may be able to decrypt a particular byte of a cypher text in as few as 256 attempts. | Medium | It has been observed that the remote host is vulnerable to padding oracle attack. | It is recommended to disable SSLv3. Services that must support SSLv3 should enable the TLS Fallback SCSV mechanism until SSLv3 can be disabled. |



| Terminal Services | In order to achieve robust | Medium | It has been observed that | It is recommended to enable |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Doesn't Use | server authentication through | | services don't use only | Network Level Authentication |
| Network Level | TLS/SSL or Kerberos | | for Network Level | (NLA) on the remote RDP |
| Authentication | protocols, NLA uses the | | Authentication (NLA). | server. This is generally done on |
| (NLA) Only | Credential Security Support | | | the 'Remote' tab of the 'System' |
| | Provider (CredSSP) protocol. | | | settings on Windows. |
| | This protocol helps prevent | | | _ |
| | man-in-the-middle attacks, | | | |
| | but if it is not configured | | | |
| | correctly, an attacker may use | | | |
| | it to their advantage. | | | |
| TLS Version 1.1 | TLS 1.1 does not permit the | Medium | It has been | It is recommended to enable |
| Protocol | usage of cyphers that support | | Observed that | support for TLS 1.2 and/or 1.3, |
| Deprecated | encryption prior to MAC | | Remote host supports | and disable support for TLS 1.1. |
| | computation or authorised | | TLS version 1.1. | |
| | encryption modes like GCM. | | | |
| | Hence, a man-in-the-middle | | | |
| | attack on the remote host is | | | |
| | possible. | | | |
| SSL Certificate | A brute force attack can | Low | It has been observed that | It is recommended to replace the |
| Chain Contains | readily be used to break an | | 2048-bit RSA key | certificate in the chain with the |
| RSA Keys Less | encryption with a key size | | provides 112-bit of | RSA key less than 2048 bits in |
| Than 2048 bits | less than 2048 bits. | | security. | length with a longer key, and |
| | | | | reissue any certificates signed |
| | | | | by the old certificate. |

Table 8: Workstation Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan through IISRA Framework

| Vulnerabilities | Impact | Risk | Observations | Recommendations |
|-----------------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Apache 2.4.x< | The remote host's | Critical | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
| 2.4.53 Multiple | installation of Apache | | that the remote host is | upgrade the Apache version |
| Vulnerabilities | HTTP Daemon is version | | using older Apache | to 2.4.53 or above. |
| | 2.4.46, which has a | | version | |
| | number of vulnerabilities. | | | |
| | A carefully constructed | | | |
| | request body could result | | | |
| | in a read to a random | | | |
| | region of memory, which | | | |
| | might result in a process | | | |
| | crash. When problems are | | | |
| | discovered, it neglects to | | | |
| | terminate the inbound | | | |
| | connection, discarding the | | | |
| | request body and leaving | | | |
| | the server vulnerable to | | | |
| | HTTP Request Smuggling | | | |
| | Acknowledgements. | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |



| 14: 0.007 | m | G :: 1 | T. 1 | T |
|------------------|------------------------------|----------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Microsoft SQL | The remote Windows | Critical | It has been Observed | It is recommended to |
| Server | host's Microsoft SQL | | that Microsoft SQL | upgrade to Microsoft SQL |
| Unsupported | Server is no longer | | Server on the remote | Server 2019 (15.x). |
| Version | maintained and is likely to | | host is no longer | |
| Detection | have security | | supported. | |
| (remote check) | vulnerabilities that an | | | |
| | attacker could exploit. | | | |
| SSL Version 2 | Man-in-the-middle | Critical | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
| and 3 Protocol | attacks or the decryption | | that devices are using | disable SSL 2.0 and 3.0. |
| Detection | of client-to-affected | | SSL version 2.0 and | Use TLS 1.2 with higher |
| | service communications | | 3.0. | cipher suites. |
| | are also options for an | | | 1 |
| | attacker. | | | |
| SSL Medium | The attacker would find it | High | It has been | It is recommended to |
| Strength Cipher | much simpler to get | ing. | observed that SSL is | reconfigure the affected |
| Suites Supported | around medium strength | | using medium strength | application if possible to |
| (SWEET32) | encryption if they were on | | encryption such as | avoid use of medium |
| (SWELT32) | the same physical | | DES-CBC3- SHA | strength ciphers. |
| | network as the remote | | which can be easily | strength ciphers. |
| | host, which supports the | | compromised if the | |
| | | | attacker is on the same | |
| | use of SSL ciphers that | | | |
| CNIMID | provide it. | TT' 1 | physical network. | Territoria |
| SNMP Agent | The remote system's | High | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
| Default | configuration could be | | that | disable the SNMP service |
| Community | altered by an attacker. if | | Remote host | on the remote host if you do |
| Name (public) | such alterations are | | SNMP Agent | not use it. Either filter |
| | allowed by the default | | Using default | incoming UDP packets |
| | community. | | community name that | going to this port, or change |
| | | | is "Public" | the default community |
| | | | | string. |
| SSL Certificate | This can be used by an | High | It has been observed | It is recommended to sign |
| Signed Using | attacker to create a new | | that SSL certificate is | SSL certificate using strong |
| Weak Hashing | certificate with the | | signed using SHA-1 | encryption algorithm such |
| Algorithm | identical digital signature, | | With RSA Encryption. | as SHA-512. |
| | giving them the ability to | | | |
| | pretend to be the affected | | | |
| | Service. | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Unencrypted | This enables a remote | High | It has been | It is recommended to |
| Telnet Server | man-in-the-middle | | Observed that remote | disable the Telnet service |
| | attacker to eavesdrop in | | host is using | and use SSH instead. |
| | on a Telnet session to | | unencrypted telnet | ust sail instant. |
| | intercept traffic between a | | services. Since telnet | |
| | client and server and | | is being used inside | |
| | intercept credentials or | | the secured | |
| | other sensitive | | network hence it has | |
| | | | | |
| | information. | | least impact. | |
| | | | | |



| SMB Signing not enabled | This can be used by a remote, unauthenticated attacker to launch man-in-the-middle attacks against the SMB server. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is not signing SMB Server. | It is recommended to enable signing is on the remote SMB server. On Windows, this is found in the policy setting 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)'. |
|---|--|--------|---|--|
| SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted | Any interruption in the chain makes it more difficult for users to confirm the authenticity and identity of the web server if the remote host is a public host in production. This might make man-in-the-middle attacks against the remote | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using untrusted SSL certificate. | It is recommended to purchase or generate a proper SSL certificate for this service. |
| SSL RC4 Cipher Suites Supported (Bar Mitzvah) | host simpler to execute. An attacker may be able to deduce the plaintext if the plaintext is repeatedly encrypted (for example, in HTTP cookies) and the attacker can access a large number of ciphertexts (tens of millions). | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using weak cipher suite such as RC4- MD5-128bit and RC4- SHA1-128bit. | It is recommended to reconfigure the affected application, if possible, to avoid use of RC4 ciphers. Consider using TLS 1.2 with AES-GCM suites subject to browser and web server support. |
| SSLv3 Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption Vulnerability (POODLE) | A man-in-the-middle (MitM) information disclosure technique called POODLE can be used by an attacker. If a MitM attacker is successful in getting a target application to repeatedly send the same data over freshly formed SSL 3.0 connections, they may be able to decrypt a particular byte of a cypher text in as few as 256 attempts. | Medium | It has been observed that the remote host is vulnerable to padding oracle attack. | It is recommended to disable SSLv3. Services that must support SSLv3 should enable the TLS Fallback SCSV mechanism until SSLv3 can be disabled. |
| JQuery 1.2 < 3.5.0 Multiple XSS | Cross-site scripting attacks can be carried out in a variety of ways by an attacker. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is running on outdated jQuery version. | It is recommended to upgrade to jQuery version 3.5.0 or later. |



| IP Forwarding | An attacker can use this to | Medium | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
|------------------|-----------------------------|------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Enabled | evade some firewalls, | 1,10010111 | that IP forwarding is | disable the IP Forwarding. |
| | routers, and NAC filtering | | enabled on remote | and it is it is it is it. |
| | by routing packets | | hosts. | |
| | through the host. | | | |
| HTTP TRACE | With an XmlHttpRequest, | Medium | It is observed the | It is recommended to |
| /TRACK | the attacker is reading | | vulnerability can only | disable these HTTP |
| Methods | cookies using the | | be used when targeting | methods. |
| Allowed | TRACE/TRACK method | | users with unpatched | |
| | of cross-site scripting. | | and old browsers. | |
| | Modern browsers are | | | |
| | unable to accomplish this, | | | |
| | hence the vulnerability | | | |
| | can only be used to target | | | |
| | users of outdated and | | | |
| | unpatched browsers. | | | |
| Terminal | In order to achieve robust | Medium | It has been observed | It is recommended to enable |
| Services Doesn't | server authentication | | that services don't | Network Level |
| Use Network | through TLS/SSL or | | use only for Network | Authentication (NLA) on |
| Level | Kerberos protocols, NLA | | Level Authentication | the remote RDP server. This |
| Authentication | uses the Credential | | (NLA). | is generally done on the |
| (NLA) Only | Security Support Provider | | | 'Remote' tab of the 'System' |
| | (CredSSP) protocol. This | | | settings on Windows. |
| | protocol helps prevent | | | |
| | man-in-the-middle | | | |
| | attacks, but if it is not | | | |
| | configured correctly, an | | | |
| | attacker may use it to | | | |
| | their advantage. | | | |
| TLS Version 1.1 | TLS 1.1 does not permit | Medium | It has been | It is recommended to enable |
| Protocol | the usage of cyphers that | | Observed that | support for TLS 1.2 and/or |
| Deprecated | support encryption prior | | Remote host supports | 1.3, and disable support for |
| | to MAC computation or | | TLS version 1.1. | TLS 1.1. |
| | authorised encryption | | | |
| | modes like GCM. Hence, | | | |
| | a man-in-the-middle | | | |
| | attack on the remote host | | | |
| 0077777 | is possible. | _ | | |
| SSH Weak Key | Attackers can quickly | Low | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
| Exchange | take advantage of a | | that | disable the weak key |
| Algorithms | remote SSH server that is | | Remote host allow | exchange algorithms. |
| Enabled | set up to support | | weak key exchange | |
| | weak key exchange | | algorithms. The | |
| | algorithms. | | following are weak | |
| | | | key exchange | |
| | | | algorithms that are enabled: | |
| | | | | |
| | | | diffie-hellman- group- | |
| | | | exchange-sha1 | |



| | | | diffie-hellman- | |
|-----------------|---------------------------|-----|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | group1-sha1 | |
| SSL Certificate | A brute force attack can | Low | It has been observed | It is recommended to |
| Chain Contains | readily be used to break | | that 2048-bit RSA key | replace the certificate in the |
| RSA Keys Less | an encryption with a key | | provides 112-bit of | chain with the RSA key less |
| Than 2048 bits | size less than 2048 bits. | | security. | than 2048 bits in length with |
| | | | | a longer key, and reissue |
| | | | | any certificates signed by |
| | | | | the old certificate. |

Table 9: WIFI Controller Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan through IISRA Framework

| Vulnerabilities | Impact | Risk | Observations | Recommendations |
|--|--|----------|--|--|
| SSL Version 2 and 3 Protocol Detection | Man-in-the-middle attacks or the decryption of client-to-affected service communications are also options for an attacker. | Critical | It has been observed that devices are using SSL version 2.0 and 3.0. | It is recommended to disable SSL 2.0 and 3.0. Use TLS 1.2 with higher cipher suites. |
| SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32) | The attacker would find it much simpler to get around medium strength encryption if they were on the same physical network as the remote host, which supports the use of SSL ciphers that provide it. | High | It has been observed that SSL is using medium strength encryption such as DES-CBC3- SHA which can be easily compromised if the attacker is on the same physical network. | It is recommended to reconfigure the affected application if possible to avoid use of medium strength ciphers. |
| TLS Version 1.1 Protocol Deprecated | TLS 1.1 does not permit the usage of cyphers that support encryption prior to MAC computation or authorised encryption modes like GCM. Hence, a man-in-the-middle attack on the remote host is possible. | Medium | It has been Observed that Remote host supports TLS version 1.1. | It is recommended to enable support for TLS 1.2 and/or 1.3, and disable support for TLS 1.1. |
| SSL RC4 Cipher Suites Supported (Bar Mitzvah) | An attacker may be able to deduce the plaintext if the plaintext is repeatedly encrypted (for example, in HTTP cookies) and the attacker can access a large number of ciphertexts (tens of millions). | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using weak cipher suite such as RC4- MD5-128bit and RC4- SHA1-128bit. | It is recommended to reconfigure the affected application, if possible, to avoid use of RC4 ciphers. Consider using TLS 1.2 with AES-GCM suites subject to browser and web server support. |



| SSLv3 Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption Vulnerability (POODLE) | A man-in-the-middle (MitM) information disclosure technique called POODLE can be used by an attacker. If a MitM attacker is successful in getting a target application to repeatedly send the same data over freshly formed SSL 3.0 connections, they may be able to decrypt a particular byte of a cypher text in as few as 256 attempts | Medium | It has been observed that the remote host is vulnerable to padding oracle attack. | It is recommended to disable SSLv3. Services that must support SSLv3 should enable the TLS Fallback SCSV mechanism until SSLv3 can be disabled. |
|---|---|--------|---|---|
| SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted | attempts. Any interruption in the chain makes it more difficult for users to confirm the authenticity and identity of the web server if the remote host is a public host in production. This might make man-in-the-middle attacks against the remote host simpler to execute. | Medium | It has been observed that remote host is using untrusted SSL certificate. | It is recommended to purchase or generate a proper SSL certificate for this service. |
| SSH Server CBC Mode Ciphers Enabled | Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption is supported by the SSH server's configuration. An attacker might then be able to extract the plaintext from the ciphertext. | Low | It has been observed that remote host is using CBC Mode Cipher. The following Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) algorithms are supported: 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes256-cbc | It is recommended to disable CBC mode cipher encryption, and enable CTR or GCM cipher mode encryption. |
| SSH Weak Key Exchange Algorithms Enabled | Attackers can quickly take advantage of a remote SSH server that is set up to support weak key exchange algorithms. | Low | It has been observed that Remote host allow weak key exchange algorithms. The following are weak key exchange algorithms that are enabled: diffie-hellman- group-exchange-shal diffie-hellman-group1-shal | It is recommended to disable the weak key exchange algorithms. |



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IV. CONCLUSION

In this Research paper, we have developed an Integrated Information Security Risk Assessment (IISRA) Framework for network vulnerabilities identification. We have assessed network vulnerabilities of an organization through IISRA framework. For the network vulnerability assessment, we have categorized assets in four categories: Network devices, servers, workstations and WIFI controller. We have observed that these devices are vulnerable to various network related security issues as on date tasted. We found that these devices has eight critical, nine high, twenty five medium and six low network risk vulnerability.

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