AI-Enabled Warfare and the Transformation of India’s Defence Policy (2016-2025)

Abstract

This article examines the role of artificial intelligence in reshaping India’s defence policy between 2016 and 2025. It argues that AI-enabled systems have significantly altered the informational and operational architecture within which India formulates strategic decisions while remaining mediated by institutional structures and normative safeguards. Drawing upon structural realism, military innovation theory, and bureaucratic politics, the study demonstrates that AI adoption reflects balancing behavior in response to China’s rapid modernization and evolving regional competition. Through qualitative analysis of post-2016 crises, including the surgical strikes, the Balakot airstrike, and the Ladakh standoff, the article concludes that India’s defence transformation represents technologically mediated evolution rather than doctrinal rupture. Artificial intelligence enhances intelligence integration, logistical sustainability, and decision support, yet strategic judgment remains fundamentally political.

Introduction

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into military systems is transforming modern warfare by improving data processing, pattern recognition, predictive analysis, and decision-making speed. Unlike earlier military revolutions focused on weapons or mechanization, AI mainly changes the informational domain of warfare, influencing how militaries observe, analyze, and respond to threats.

In the Indo-Pacific region, technological development is closely linked to strategic competition. China has adopted a doctrine of “intelligentized warfare,” integrating AI into surveillance, command systems, autonomous platforms, and logistics. In response, India has accelerated digital modernization, especially between 2016 and 2025, a period marked by events such as the 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 Balakot airstrike, and the 2020 Ladakh standoff. These developments suggest a more assertive defense posture supported by improved intelligence and technology.

The article argues that AI has reshaped the informational and operational structure of India’s defense strategy, particularly in areas like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), predictive logistics, and decision-support systems. However, AI does not independently transform defense policy; its influence is moderated by institutional structures, political decision-making, and normative commitments such as maintaining human control over lethal decisions.

To explain this transformation, the study combines several theoretical perspectives:

• Structural realism, which explains India’s AI adoption as a response to shifting power dynamics and China’s technological rise.

• Military innovation theory, which highlights the importance of organizational reform, training, and doctrine for successfully integrating new technologies.

• Bureaucratic politics theory, which shows that defense modernization results from negotiation among government institutions, military branches, and research agencies.

AI also affects crisis stability, particularly in the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship. Improved surveillance and data analysis can strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty about enemy actions. However, faster decision cycles and automated analysis could also increase escalation risks if leaders feel pressured to act quickly.

In relation to China, AI adoption reflects broader strategic balancing. China’s centralized system enables rapid technological integration, while India’s democratic governance introduces procedural checks that slow but stabilize modernization.

Finally, the study highlights ethical and legal concerns surrounding AI in warfare. Autonomous weapons raise issues of accountability, reliability, and compliance with international humanitarian law. India emphasizes meaningful human control over AI-assisted military systems to maintain ethical standards and strategic stability.

Overall, AI acts as a force multiplier rather than a revolutionary replacement for human decision-making. Its impact on India’s defense policy depends on systemic rivalry, institutional capacity, and political oversight, shaping how technology influences deterrence, crisis management, and military modernization.

Conclusion

Between 2016 and 2025, India’s defence policy has undergone measurable recalibration accompanied by accelerated digital integration. Artificial intelligence has enhanced intelligence fusion, predictive logistics, and decision-support capability. These improvements have strengthened operational confidence and enabled calibrated assertiveness in crisis response. Yet transformation remains mediated by institutional structure and normative governance. Structural realism explains AI adoption as balancing behavior in response to China’s modernization. Military innovation theory demonstrates that organizational adaptation determines strategic impact. Bureaucratic politics reveals how procurement reform and civil–military oversight shape implementation. In the India–Pakistan dyad, AI modifies informational dynamics without overturning the stability–instability paradox. Artificial intelligence reshapes the informational architecture of strategy. It accelerates and augments decision-making, but it does not replace political judgment. In nuclear South Asia, deterrence remains fundamentally human. Technology expands options, yet responsibility remains embedded within institutional control. India’s defence transformation during this period is therefore best understood as technologically mediated evolution rather than doctrinal rupture. The trajectory of AI-enabled warfare in the region will depend upon continued institutional reform, responsible governance, and careful management of escalation dynamics.

References

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Copyright

Copyright © 2026 Utkrisht Yadav, Jyotika Teckchandani . This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.