A Privacy-Preserving Blockchain Voting System with Cryptographic and Steganographic Security

Abstract

Democratic societies rely heavily on elections that citizens can trust, yet traditional voting methods—whether through paper ballots or Electronic voting machines (EVMs)—continue to struggle with issues like vote tampering, duplicate identities(unique voting ID), low transparency, and delayed results. Blockchain is used at the centre of this system because it functions without a single authority and keeps stored records fixed once they are written. This design removes a single point of attack and makes any hidden alteration of voting information highly unlikely. To strengthen security, cryptography is applied to protect voter identities and to confirm that only authorised individuals can cast a ballot. Steganography adds another layer by placing sensitive voting details within ordinary digital formats, which makes unauthorised detection or interference far less likely. In this work, we built and evaluated an e-voting model that runs on a blockchain network, maintains the principle of one vote per person, allows verification through a distributed set of nodes, and guards confidential data through multiple security measures. The outcome of this study indicates that bringing together a decentralised ledger, encryption, and concealed data techniques can support a more dependable and harder-to-tamper online voting platform, demonstrated here through a simple web-based prototype.

Introduction

Blockchain has gained mainstream attention because it enables secure, verifiable record-keeping across distributed networks without relying on a central authority. Its evolution from simple shared ledgers to platforms supporting smart contracts allows decentralized execution of complex operations with trust and automation. Each block in a blockchain links to the previous one and stores transactions in a Merkle root, making tampering highly detectable. Nodes in the network validate transactions and blocks, ensuring reliability and synchronization.

Digital voting systems face challenges like ensuring vote integrity, preventing undetected alterations, maintaining scalability, and sustaining public trust. Blockchain offers solutions by distributing verification across multiple nodes, reducing single points of failure, and providing permanent, auditable records. Smart contracts automate repetitive tasks, such as ballot recording and audit logging, reducing manual errors and administrative burden.

The proposed blockchain voting framework includes several stages:

1. Enrollment: Users receive temporary tokens confirming eligibility.

2. Access Validation: Tokens ensure single-vote enforcement.

3. Secure Processing: Votes are processed, with cryptographic hashes stored on the ledger to ensure tamper evidence.

4. Data Management: Minimal metadata is stored in lightweight databases to protect privacy.

5. Distributed Verification: Independent nodes validate ledger hashes.

6. Result Compilation: Internal votes are matched to ledger hashes for user verification.

The system is implemented using an MVC architecture:

• Controller: User interface for input collection.

• View: Processes actions, communicates with blockchain, enforces rules.

• Model: Stores voter information, verification records, and voting data.

Votes are recorded using smart contracts with Solidity structs and mappings, allowing secure, auditable storage of candidate information and vote counts. A lightweight front-end interacts with backend services via temporary session tokens, ensuring secure access without exposing sensitive data. The layered design separates user interaction, vote processing, and data storage, maintaining integrity and privacy while allowing voters to participate easily.

Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a conceptual voting platform that incorporates distributed-ledger concepts to reorganise the way digital ballots are handled and verified. Rather than positioning blockchain as a replacement for existing election infrastructures, the system demonstrates how decentralised record-validation can complement traditional digital workflows by offering a tamper-resistant method for tracking vote activity, consistent with established blockchain architectural principles [1]. For environments where administrative oversight is limited, such an approach can reduce dependency on central authorities and support more accountable governance practices [7]. Over the years, numerous electronic voting prototypes have attempted to modernise decision-making processes, but many fell short due to weaknesses in process validation, limited transparency, or operational rigidity. These challenges have motivated a shift toward voting frameworks that incorporate formal verification and traceable event structures, allowing system correctness to be evaluated more rigorously—an approach supported by findings in recent verification-focused research [8]. Likewise, advances in blockchain-enabled security models indicate that decentralised data protection mechanisms can significantly enhance auditability and reduce the risks posed by centralised vulnerabilities [9]. Unlike many earlier digital voting approaches that relied heavily on central servers, systems built on distributed-ledger principles—such as the prototype developed in this study—offer a more resilient foundation by decentralising verification and reducing points of failure. Even so, blockchain cannot independently satisfy every requirement of a real election. Critical tasks, particularly confirming the true identity of each participant, still depend on trusted external methods such as biometric checks or government-issued credentials, which must operate alongside the ledger to ensure complete system reliability [12]. Although blockchain introduces new opportunities for improving transparency and strengthening audit trails, its current form is not yet equipped to handle the scale, diversity, and operational demands of nationwide elections. Meaningful progress in areas like network capacity will be necessary before blockchain can fully supported.

References

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Copyright

Copyright © 2026 Prof. Ramesh Kumar K R, Zoya Fathima, Varsha Meti, M. Venu. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.